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Abstract—Sociological models (e.g., social network analysis, 
small-group dynamic and gang models) have historically been used 
to predict the behavior of terrorist groups. However, they may not be 
the most appropriate method for understanding the behavior of 
terrorist organizations because the models were not initially intended 
to incorporate violent behavior of its subjects. Rather, models that 
incorporate life and death competition between subjects, i.e., models 
utilized by scientists to examine the behavior of wildlife populations, 
may provide a more accurate analysis. This paper suggests the use of 
biological models to attain a more robust method for understanding 
the behavior of terrorist organizations as compared to traditional 
methods. This study also describes how a biological population 
model incorporating predator-prey behavior factors can predict 
terrorist organizational recruitment behavior for the purpose of 
understanding the factors that govern the growth and decline of 
terrorist organizations. The Lotka-Volterra, a biological model that is 
based on a predator-prey relationship, is applied to a highly 
suggestive case study, that of the Irish Republican Army. This case 
study illuminates how a biological model can be utilized to 
understand the actions of a terrorist organization.  
 
Keywords—Biological Models, Lotka-Volterra Predator-Prey 
Model, Terrorist Organizational Behavior, Terrorist Recruitment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
NE of the primary missions in the War against Terror has 
been to examine the participants, actions, and funding 
mechanisms of terrorist organizations. This process has 
allowed analysts to identify and interpret clues to determine 
whether and when an impending terrorist act is going to occur, 
and has guided the development of policies for the purpose of 
preventing future attacks.  
When studying organizational behavior, analysts most often 
utilize models developed by sociologists. Research has also 
indicated that these are the models of choice when studying 
the behavior of terrorist organizations [1]. However, 
sociological models were originally intended to study the 
behavior of non-violent organizations. Analysts looking at 
terrorist organizations had to adjust these models to account 
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for the individuals who have no regard for conventional social 
mores.  
What most analysts forget is that there are models available 
which were developed to incorporate competition between 
organizations and individuals, as well as fighting and 
organized warfare. They are the models utilized to describe 
interactions between biological populations. The data analysis 
is used to predict which individual in a population is most 
virulent and which population will succeed in a competition 
over resources and shared habitats. These models were built 
with the expectation that populations will die off and be 
replaced by others.  
This study discusses the current models used for the 
analysis of a terrorist organization – social network analysis, 
small-group dynamic, and gang – and suggests that models 
used to study the interactions between biological populations 
might be a better alternative. To support this theory, this study 
demonstrates how one particular biological model, the Lotka-
Volterra predator-prey model, can accurately analyze the 
recruitment of a terrorist organization, the Irish Republican 
Army. 
II. CURRENT MODELING EFFORTS 
Understanding the behavior of terrorist organizations can 
help determine if current policies for combating terrorism are 
effective and aid in the development of more successful 
policies. There are very few analysts examining the behavior 
of terrorist organizations. The Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies completed a literature search looking for resources 
studying the behavior of terrorist cells; the result was that 
there are very few resources available [2]. Our own research 
also identified the same lack of resources and we believe we 
identified why this is the case.  
There are three types of sociological models commonly 
used to examine the dynamics of terrorist organizations: social 
network analysis (SNA) models; small-group dynamic 
models; and gang models. Social theorists utilize SNA models 
to understand human group dynamics; specifically, they have 
attempted to use these models to describe the behavioral 
structure of terrorist organizations [3]. However, these models 
are typically used to describe organizations that have stable 
social structures and engage in non-terrorist activities, e.g., 
cleaning beaches, running corporations, and raising money for 
cancer research. Terrorist organizations do not follow the 
normal group dynamics motivated by philanthropy and 
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generosity that one would find at a fire department or Rotary 
club. Their organizational behavior is driven by a need for 
their message to survive and ensure their enemies do not. The 
differences between terrorists and other organizations are 
significant enough to suggest that SNA models might not be 
the most appropriate method for predicting the actions of 
terrorist organizations.  
Due to the secretive nature of terrorist organizations, 
researchers have had difficulties understanding terrorist group 
dynamics; as a result, social scientists have also attempted to 
utilize small-group dynamic models to aid in the 
understanding of terrorist group dynamics [4]. However, as 
with SNA, utilizing models meant for small-groups is not the 
most appropriate method for understanding terrorist 
organizations. These models are only appropriate when the 
organization divides itself into small entities; the models 
provide a through analysis of the smaller groups but not the 
organization as a whole. This, therefore, is not an effective 
method for determining the intent of an entire terrorist 
organization for the purposes of policy development. 
At first, gang models seem like a good alternative. Some 
analysts have applied gang models to terrorists because the 
actions of both of these populations are not ruled by morals 
and both exhibit behavior which is considered to be violent. 
However, social disorganization theory – the backbone of 
gang models – is not as effective when applied to terrorist 
groups because gangs and terrorist organizations have a very 
different organizational structure [5].   
III. WHY USE BIOLOGICAL MODELS TO PREDICT THE 
BEHAVIOR OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS? 
The study of organizational behavior has become a very 
popular method of understanding how a group of individuals 
interact to reach a common goal. Methods from sociology, 
political science, economics, psychology, and anthropology 
have been used to develop this discipline. With influences 
from both the science and mathematical fields, many different 
models have been developed to analyze organizations.  
Why then are so few scientists examining terrorist 
organizational behavior? Perhaps it is because the models 
currently being utilized do not offer accurate predictions or 
complete analyses. This consideration instigated this 
investigation of other types of models. During this study, the 
similarities among terrorist organizations and wildlife 
populations became evident. As described by Charles Darwin 
in his Theory of Natural Selection, wildlife populations 
survive because they are “fit” enough to pass their genes onto 
their young. Wildlife fitness is a “measure of the selective 
quality of genes” or their ability to reproduce [6]. Populations 
which are better “fit” than others will have a better chance of 
their genes surviving in the future. Fitness is dependant on 
feeding behavior, eating the correct food, and knowing where, 
when, and how to search for food. It is also dependant on their 
sexual behavior, choosing the appropriate mating strategy 
(monogamy or polygamy), and finding the appropriate 
mate(s). Finally, fitness is dependant on territorial behavior; 
this includes choosing an appropriate location and size for 
their territory, and an effective defensive strategy to protect 
their home [7]. In a similar way, terrorist organizations also 
have a specific strategy to increase their own “fitness.” This 
initial similarity was sufficiently strong enough to consider 
using models meant to describe wildlife populations to 
analyze terrorist organizations. 
More importantly, though, is that these models include 
violent behavior as an existing component. Competition 
between individuals and species are explicit in the models 
used by ecologists and behaviorists. For example, models 
have examined how successful weapons are in defending one 
species against their enemy [8]; estimated the time when one 
species will successfully kill off another [9]; determined 
which species will have control of the local habitat [10]; and 
verified which individual in a group will dominate the others 
[11]. Considering biological models already incorporate 
dynamics similar to those that exist between terrorist 
organizations and their victims, it solidified the decision that 
biological models may be an effective means to helping 
understand the dynamics of terrorist organizations. 
For years, biologists have used models to examine 
community dynamics: social structure; selection of habitats 
and mates; relationships with prey; time of food consumption; 
and recruitment. Wildlife managers, facing the extinction of 
many different species, have used models to predict trends 
(e.g., how a population disperses into a new habitat) or to 
understand the factors which influence or hinder the 
population growth, recruitment, and competition within a 
population. Wildlife managers make predictions knowing the 
current environment and what factors influence the population 
size of a species; they use the results from their modeling to 
determine the type of management required to reestablish a 
population, particularly common in recovery plans.  
Population models are used to describe population 
dynamics, examine interactions among species, predict 
population sizes, and aid in population management, 
especially those species which are in jeopardy of going 
extinct. This activity has helped prevent the extinction of 
higher-order animals, e.g., the gray wolf and the Florida 
panther.  
Most of these modeling activities concentrate on wildlife 
populations; species which are believed to be driven by 
instincts of survival alone without the influences of a human-
like thought process. It was thought by some that biological 
models are ineffective for understanding human population 
dynamics because they don’t take into account humans’ 
additional mental capacity – especially the ability to use 
emotions and manipulate their surroundings. They felt that 
because humans are not governed by the same rules as less 
intelligent organisms, biological models are ineffective at 
describing the relationship between fighting human 
populations. As a result, many of the models developed to 
understand human behavior during times of war are 
sociological, not biological.  
However, there has been success using a biological model 
International Journal of Human and Social Sciences 1;3 © www.waset.org Summer 2007
142
  
in the study of conventional warfare. During WWI, Frederick 
Lanchester developed a model to help understand the 
relationship of power between opposing forces, mainly 
combating forces. He used a predator-prey model to help 
determine who would be able to inflict maximum damage to 
an enemy [12]. The model is so successful, it has even been 
used outside of the military realm [13].  
Just as biologists have developed models that predict 
population trends in wildlife, basic population models can be 
used to demonstrate the effectiveness of a terrorist 
organization in predicting recruitment, i.e., population trends 
of the organization. The Lotka-Volterra (L-V) predator-prey 
population model may be particularly effective for this 
purpose. The L-V model describes population dynamics, 
particularly between two competing populations. It is a basic, 
supply and demand type model, where the population of one 
preys on another, and the size of each population has an 
impact on the size of the other population [14]. Figure 1 is a 
graph of the deaths of the members of the British Army (BA) 
and the Irish Republican Army (IRA). After examining this 
data and the dynamics of the two main participants in the 
Thirty-Years War, the L-V model was selected to analyze the 
relationship between the BA and IRA. 
By examining and understanding the population dynamics 
of an organization, one can determine its maturation and phase 
of evolution. For example, is the organization in a recruitment 
phase? Is it losing membership and support? Is it stable or is it 
going through significant change? By overlapping the 
dynamics with current events, the organizations’ behavior 
may be well understood. 
IV. THE MODEL: LOTKA-VOLTERRA PREDATOR-
PREY MODEL 
 
The L-V model was developed in the 1920s and 1930s 
independently by two individuals, Alfred Lotka and Vito 
Volterra. It is utilized to describe the fluctuating population 
sizes of two competing species. While there are many 
variations to this model, a simple supply and demand equation 
drives the model.  
There are some basic assumptions associated with the 
model:  
• “Prey will grow in an unlimited way when predators do 
not keep them under control. 
• Predators depend on the presence of their prey to 
survive. 
• The rate of predation depends on the likelihood that a 
victim is encountered by a predator. 
• The growth rate of the predator population is 
proportional to food intake (rate of predation) [15]” 
The creation of this model, consistent with these 
assumptions, leads to the following two equations: 
bxyax
dt
dx −=  (1) 
,dxycy
dt
dy +−=  (2)  
where, 
x =prey population; 
y =predator population; 
a = growth rate of the prey when predators are absent; 
c = net death rate of the predators when prey are absent; 
xy approximates the likelihood that an encounter will occur 
between both species if they move randomly and are 
distributed uniformly throughout their habitat; and 
b/d describes the efficiency of predation, converting a unit 
of prey into a unit of predator [16]. 
 
Figure 1: The Number of Deaths Per Year Due to 








































Fig. 1 The Number of Deaths per Year Due to the Conflict in Ireland 
 
 The relationship between the lynx and the snowshoe hare 
are two species which can help explain the dynamics of this 
model: the lynx, which preys on hares, converts the energy 
they gain from eating the hares into producing young. As a 
result of more reproductive energy, the lynx population 
expands, increasing their consumption of hares. As the hares 
are preyed upon by the lynx, there are fewer hares to support 
the lynx population; this decreases the amount of energy 
available for reproduction and results in a decrease in the lynx 
population. As the lynx population decreases, the hare 
population recovers. As the hare population recovers, there is 
more food available for the lynx, and the cycle starts again. 
Because of the nature of their relationship, neither population 
will go extinct due solely to the interaction between the two. 
Other outside forces, such as a loss of habitat, introduction of 
disease, or a cause other than the variables of the predator-
prey relationship, are significant factors that can impact the 
survivability of the two species.  
The basic L-V equation has been modified by many 
scientists to describe the interactions between different 
organisms [17]. This model has been widely accepted by 
biologists who use it to examine the relationship between 
foxes and pheasants, moose and wolves, and spiders and flies.  
As described above, the models currently used for 
analyzing terrorist organizations have not been able to 
adequately describe one of the unique phenomena of terrorist 
groups, i.e., the use of terrorist cells [18]. These cells help 
terrorist organizations maintain their status when they go into 
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hiding, enabling them to sustain their allegiance to their 
organization while remaining hidden from their enemies. In 
essence, they are the low population of “hares” that always 
remain in the population. Because of their limited visibility, 
they are difficult to “hunt.” Their population is sufficient to 
secretly recruit individuals and maintain a low level of 
activity. Once the pressure from the government – the lynx – 
is reduced, they begin to openly recruit individuals again, a 
phenomena seen in the IRA, providing another level of 
support for the L-V model. 
V. THE KEY MODELING DECISION – SINN FÉIN 
VERSUS THE BRITISH ARMY 
The terrorist organization selected for study in this thesis is 
the Irish Republican Army. The fighting in Ireland did not just 
consist solely of two groups; there were a number of 
organizations involved, including the British Security Forces, 
Republican Paramilitary Groups, Loyalist Paramilitary Groups 
and Irish Security Forces. One might feel it would be difficult 
to determine the direct effect of one group on another; 
however, when the number of IRA members (the number of 
Provisional and Original IRA members) killed by different 
organizations are analyzed, one clearly identifies the BA as its 
biggest “predator”.  
The L-V model mimics nature, where the predator drives 
the population of the prey. The pivotal event which 
determined who should be the predator and who should be the 
prey is the infamous Bloody Sunday. This event triggered the 
IRA to resume an active campaign against the British [19]. 
Thus, the predator for this model is considered the BA. The 
prey, whose population sizes are dependant on the predator, is 
the IRA. It is difficult to distinguish an offset cyclical-wave 
relationship between the two groups when the population of 
the BA and the IRA are compared. This is because of the 
BA’s unique population dynamic. The army, as described 
above, is a static population because the army is set to a 
predetermined size. (Everyone in a platoon has a set job; if 
someone leaves that post, another person replaces that 
individual.) The size of the BA changed as the number of 
platoons in Ireland changed, with little to no impact from the 
number of casualties [20].  
VI. KNOWN POPULATION NUMBERS 
The BA and the Royal Ulster Constabulary intelligence 
reports revealed the IRA was organized in cell structures, 
making it difficult to ascertain the actual size of the 
membership [21]. After a thorough examination of the 
available information, the best estimate of the membership of 
the IRA was that it peaked around 1,500 in the mid-1970s. 
This number decreased to roughly 500 members during the 
1994 ceasefire, coinciding with the adoption of a new 
organization of the IRA in 1979 [22]. 
Because the population numbers were not readily available, 
a different method was required to determine the rough 
population estimate of the IRA for the model. Sinn Féin (SF) 
was the political arm of the struggle of the Catholic Irish; 
therefore, the numbers of individuals voting to support SF 
gives a rough estimate of those in support of the IRA. 
Consequently, for the purpose of this study, public support of 
SF was considered the population of the IRA. Because of SF 
voting abstention until 1982, this study was limited to the last 
20 years of the conflict [23].  
The number of BA troops in Northern Ireland was not 
available for all years, for the years that data was not known, 
the numbers were interpolated by taking averages of the 
surrounding years [24]. The same procedure was performed to 
obtain number of votes for SF in the years where no voting 
occurred.  
VII. THE MODEL 
Because the two populations, the BA and SF were not 
within the predetermined assumptions of the canonical L-V 
model (Section IV), the model was modified to meet the 
anomalies. The first adaptation introduced a term placing a 
limit on the size of the population, called the carrying capacity 
[25]. The carrying capacity is the maximum size a population 
can reach taking into account the environment’s ability to 
sustain a maximum number of individuals. With no other 
factors impacting a population, after the carrying capacity is 
reached, the population will slightly increase, then, quickly 
decline, see-sawing above and below carrying capacity but 
remaining stable. The carrying capacity is calculated by 
making the growth rate dependant on the density. As 
individuals compete for food, habitat and other limited 
resources during crowded conditions, an increase in the net 
population mortality is observed. The effects are most 
pronounced when there are increasing encounters between 
individuals. Therefore, the new L-V formulas have a term 




dx −−=  (3) 
dxycy
dt
dy +−=  (4) 
where, 
(the same parameters as equation 1&2) 
K= the carrying capacity. 
In the case of terrorist groups, limiting factors would be such 
components as money, housing, arms, communication, etc. 
The model was altered to incorporate how the predator’s 
population changes over time. When an individual dies in the 
BA, that person is replaced by another soldier, so the 
population remains static unless the number of platoons is 
changed; this creates a difference of 30 soldiers at a time as 
opposed to one.  
Using the actual number of troops for the predator and the 
parameters listed below for (5) and MatLab Version 
7.0.1.24704 (R14) Service Pack 1, the number of prey was 
determined. 












A = BA population 
b = 0.005 = the hunting efficiency of the BA 
c = 100 = the recruitment rate of the IRA 
e = 500 = rate at which the IRA reaches carrying capacity 
K = 400,000 = the carrying capacity of the IRA 
Figure 2 shows the comparison of the actual number of 
votes for SF versus the predicted number of votes. Visual 
inspection demonstrates that although the numbers are 
different, the trends are consistent. Visual inspection of the 
data is important, but it is also valuable to conduct statistical 
analyses to indicate the strength of the similarities between the 
observed data and the expected or predicted data. A 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the data indicated that the data 
was consistent with a log normal distribution [26]. Therefore, 
a base 10-log transformation was applied to the data. After the 
transformation, it was found that the chi-square value of the 
data was 0.999907 and had a p value > 0.1, thus there are no 
described differences between the actual and predicted data. 
 
















































Fig. 2 The Actual Votes for Sinn Fein vs. the Predicted Number of 
Votes 
 
Pearson’s R and Spearman’s R are two additional tests used 
to describe the correlation between the two datasets. Pearson’s 
R for the non-transformed data is 0.8077 and the Pearson’s R 
for the transformed data is 0.6835. The Spearman’s R for the 
data ranked into ordinal numbers is 0.609. 
Analyses of the data prove that the population of support 
for SF is consistent with the output of the model. Changing 
the parameters does not have a significant impact on the 
model; changes cause the distribution to shift to the right or 
left, but the general trends of the model remain the same. 
When comparing the modeled population to the actual voting 
population, there are many similarities. As terrorist activity 
decreased in Northern Ireland and the IRA maintained their 
ceasefire, the BA decreased the presence of the army in the 
region; this eased tensions and allowed the BA to increase the 
army presence in areas which needed a stronger military 
presence [27]. The decrease in the number of army personnel 
(the predator) resulted in a drastic increase in SF votes in the 
latter years, particularly the late 1990s; this phenomenon was 
predicted by the model.  
A final way to analyze the model’s effectiveness is to the 
correlate the data with the history of the war in Northern 
Ireland (which also supports that the model is accurate). The 
decrease in support in the mid 1980s occurred when the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement, (strengthening the relationship 
between the British and Republic of Ireland) was not a 
republican agenda [28]. As demonstrated by the populous 
voting data, the unionist block increased as votes for the 
nationalists decreased. The decrease in support in 1994 was 
probably due to a cease-fire; SF and IRA both promised that 
there would be no ceasefire, yet the Army Council voted to 
support a four-month ceasefire [29]. The model diverges from 
the actual data from 1997 to the present; this is expected 
because the IRA agreed to a ceasefire, changing the dynamics 
between IRA and the BA.  
One of the greatest limitations of testing the validity of this 
model is the inability to identify the actual membership data of 
the IRA. The authors expect that, even with a security 
clearance, it would be difficult to determine the actual 
membership. Without this data, another means of calculating 
membership data was determined. The authors feel that SF, a 
political party in support of the actions of the IRA, was a good 
selection because their elections are open and individuals can 
freely elect whom they desire to support.  
Due to data constraints, the model itself cannot predict the 
number of individuals in support of the IRA in a particular 
year, but rather, it can be used to predict the trends of support, 
and, more specifically, popular support. Popular support 
influences recruitment efforts, the size, and the impact of the 
actions taken by the IRA.  
Though the L-V model cannot be performed for every 
terrorist organization; this study demonstrates that trends of 
support can be determined by analyzing how the population 
numbers of the BA changed over time. This indicates 
preliminary support to the original hypothesis – terrorist 
organizations are working under the same stressors as wildlife 
populations. An adaptation of this model may help 
governments analyze the trends seen in these organizations 
and assist in determining their approach to eliminating 
terrorism. Further research, such as greater analysis of social 
organization, is necessary; however, this is a good first step to 
identifying the drivers of the “terrorist” social organization. 
Future modeling should be developed to recognize trends and 
help identify how governments may counteract these 
organizations. The success of this model to predict past trends 
of the interaction of SF and the BA also indicates that 
biological models are available as another tool for 
understanding terrorist population dynamics.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Governments use the output of models to create and 
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implement policies to fight the War on Terrorism. In order for 
them to succeed in this war, it is important for models to be 
developed that accurately describing their subject’s behavior. 
A review of the current literature demonstrates that there are 
not many studies that successfully examine the dynamics of 
terrorist organizations. This may be because analysts depend 
on models which are not appropriate for understanding 
terrorist organizational behavior, as current models are either 
utilizing non-violent models or incorporate violent behavior 
vectors into their formulas.  
Biological models were applied to terrorist organizations 
because they incorporate the dynamics that exist between 
terrorist organizations and their victims, as well as provide the 
population dynamics of a selected population. For the case 
study, this study utilized a Lotka-Volterra predator-prey 
model to describe the recruitment behavior of a terrorist 
organization. Even though the examination was relatively 
simple and preliminary, it was successful in describing the 
trends seen in the case study population.  
The authors anticipate that this is not the only behavior of 
terrorist organizations that can be explained by biological 
models. Examination of the literature demonstrates that other 
types of biological models may be modified, exactly as 
described in this study, to aid in the analysis of other aspects 
of terrorist organizations. Additional research should focus on 
identifying and developing these models to help fight the War 
on Terrorism. 
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